Planning and Environment Court: EU-relevant case summaries (Draft Title)

 


A curated set of recent Irish planning and environmental cases showing how the courts apply key EU environmental directives in practice. Each case study briefly explains the facts, the relevant EU law (including Habitats and EIA Directives), and the court’s ultimate decision and remedy. Designed as a practical reference for understanding current trends in Planning and Environmental Court litigation and judicial review.

 

 


Reid v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors [2024] IEHC 27

The applicant, a farmer, challenged planning permission granted to Intel Ireland Ltd by the first respondent, An Bord Pleanála ("the Board"), for modifications to a manufacturing facility in Leixlip, Co. Kildare. The changes involved increased building heights and changes to chemical storage. The applicant's previous challenges in 2017 and 2019 to planning permissions had both failed. Crucially, the applicant argued that the Board broke EU environmental laws by not properly assessing the environmental impact, not following correct planning procedures, and failing to publish its decision online for the public in time. This case focused on whether the 2020 decision complied with obligations under three key EU environmental directives.

Relevant EU Directives

  1. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): In line with Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, Humphreys J. noted that a competent authority must provide reasons to show that there is no reasonable scientific doubt as to a project’s effects on a protected site as established in Eco Advocacy (C-721/21) (para. 65). Mr. Reid claimed that the board failed to properly assess ecological risks. Humphreys J. found that the Appropriate Assessment (AA) screening was included in the inspector’s report, which the board lawfully adopted. While clearer documentation was encouraged, Humphreys J. held in para. 71 that “implicit adoption by the board of the inspector’s report on such matters is not in itself a basis to quash a decision.”
  2. EIA Directive (Council Directive 2011/92/EU): Mr. Reid alleged that the Intel development should have undergone EIA screening. Humphreys J. rejected this, finding that the Intel development did not fall within Annexes I or II of the Directive. Therefore, no screening or full EIA was legally required. Humphreys J. concluded in para. 86 that it was clear “that this is not an EIA project for the simple reason that it does not come within Annexes I and II of the EIA directive.” 
  3. Seveso III Directive (Council Directive 2012/18/EU): Under this directive, industrial sites storing hazardous substances must assess environmental risk. The applicant cited Intel’s storage of silane, and whilst Humphreys J. acknowledged this, he held that the facility was not primarily used for chemical storage and thus, did not qualify under the relevant Annex II categories as the Directive applies only to dedicated chemical storage facilities. Humphreys J. agreed with the Board, stating in para. 79 that: “Put simply, a facility which manufactures circuits and circuit boards is not an industrial estate development project nor is it a facility for the storage of chemicals.”

Key EU Law Points

Regarding remedial obligations, Humphreys J. rejected the applicant’s claim that a fresh AA was required due to earlier alleged defects, noting no prior legal finding of invalidity, no formal request for a remedial AA, and that the EPA had addressed the relevant concerns. Humphreys J. held in para. 62 that “…the applicant hasn’t come anywhere near even attempting [to prove a prior AA breach].” As outlined in para.139, although the substantive planning challenge failed, the Court issued a declaration under the Aarhus Convention, finding that the Board breached its duty by failing to publish its decision online for over 18 months: “This is not a minor or insignificant matter and warrants being marked appropriately by a declaratory order”.

Conclusion

Humphreys J. upheld the planning permission granted to Intel in 2020. However, Humphreys J. issued a declaration against the Board for breaching public access obligations by failing to publish the decision in a timely manner.

Link to Judgement

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Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558

The applicant challenged a decision by the respondent, An Bord Pleanála (“the Board”), granting planning permission to Pat McDonagh for a Motorway Service Area near Ennis, Co. Clare. The challenge focused on concerns regarding wastewater treatment. The development included an on-site Wastewater Treatment Plant (“WwTP”) that would ultimately discharge into Uisce Éireann’s Clareabbey WwTP. The applicant, a civil engineer and planning consultant, claimed the Clareabbey WwTP lacked hydraulic capacity to accommodate the additional load, and that this could impact protected European sites (Special Area of Conservation, ‘SACs’, and Special Protection Areas, ‘SPAs’) under the Habitats Directive. The Board had relied on submissions from Uisce Éireann - including a “no objection” statement - and on environmental reports, including Annual Environmental Reports (AERs) showing the plant was within capacity. The applicant argued that the Board failed to consider or properly engage with scientific data on capacity and stormwater overflows, breaching obligations under EU environmental law. He also cited past planning refusals and EPA concerns as evidence of insufficient capacity. This case examined two main EU Directives.

Relevant EU Law Directives

  1. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): Article 6(3) requires an Appropriate Assessment (“AA”) for any plan or project likely to affect a European site. At para. 37, Holland J. observed the following as to the requirement for scientific evidence and certainty in AA: “Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive requires that AA contain complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt as to the effects of the proposed works on European sites”. Holland J. noted that the Board must do its own AA but may in so doing adopt its inspector’s report as to AA, as established in South West Regional Shopping Centre v An Bord Pleanála [2016] IEHC 84. Holland J. held that the Board could lawfully adopt the inspector’s AA findings and that its conclusion - that there would be no adverse effect on site integrity - was rational and evidence-based. 
  2. Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (Council Directive 91/271/EEC) (“the UWWTD”): Mr. Duffy alleged that stormwater overflows (“SWOs”) and WwTP load breaches violated this Directive. Holland J. observed in para. 37 that under this Directive, all urban wastewater must be treated before it is discharged:
    “By Article 4(1) UWWTD, all urban wastewater entering collecting systems must be subject to secondary or equivalent treatment before discharge. The UWWTD recognises a general need for secondary treatment to prevent adverse effect on the environment by urban waste water effluent discharge.”
    Holland J. also discussed, in the same paragraph, the nature of secondary treatment:
    “The UWWTD defines ‘secondary treatment’ as treatment of urban wastewater by a process generally involving biological treatment with a secondary settlement or other process in which the requirements established in Table 1 of Annex I are respected. Table 1 states requirements for discharges from urban waste water treatment plants as to Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD5), Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) and Total Suspended Solids.”
    Holland J. acknowledged the relevance of Commission v. Ireland (Case C-427/17) which emphasised the need for limiting SWOs and ensuring proper treatment. However, Holland J. stated that these points were not properly pleaded. Furthermore, Holland J. accepted that even if SWOs existed, the Board was not required to reject planning permission solely on that basis. Regarding enforcement of WwDL compliance, Holland J. held that this lies primarily with the EPA, not the planning authority.

Key EU Law Points

Holland J. reaffirmed that under the Habitats Directive, AA must be based on complete and precise scientific information and must remove all reasonable scientific doubt. The Board may lawfully adopt its inspector’s AA if fully accepted, and Holland J. found that the Board’s AA was rational and legally sufficient. Under the UWWTD, all wastewater must receive secondary treatment, and uncontrolled stormwater overflows such as SWOs may breach this requirement. Although Holland J. acknowledged relevant CJEU case law on SWOs, ultimately, he declined to rule on those issues as they were not properly pleaded. Holland J. held that enforcement of wastewater treatment compliance lies with the EPA, not the planning authority.

Conclusion

Holland J. dismissed the judicial review, finding that the Board’s AA was lawful and rational. The Board was entitled to rely on Uisce Éireann’s submissions and consistent annual environmental data indicating sufficient WwTP capacity. The applicant failed to properly plead key claims, particularly under the UWWTD, and advanced assertions unsupported by evidence. No breach of EU law or procedural unfairness was established.

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Noel Murphy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 117

The applicant sought leave to judicially review the first respondent, An Bord Pleanála’s (“the Board”), decision to grant planning permission for a gas turbine power station in Finglas, Co. Dublin. He challenged the decision on grounds relating to the County Development Plan and alleged failures under the EIA and Habitats Directives. However, he had not participated in any stage of the planning process, despite multiple public consultation opportunities, and admitted he was not personally affected by the development. 

Relevant EU Directives

  1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicant argued that the Board failed to comply with its obligations under the EIA Directive, particularly regarding project splitting and the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process. Farrell J. acknowledged in para. 76 that EU law requires “wide access to justice”, but clarified that this does not mean unlimited access, nor does it require standing for any member of the public raising EU law issues:
    “EU law allows national courts impose their own rules regarding standing, once the rules are compliant with EU Law – the rules must be applied in a manner which satisfies the “wide access to justice” requirement of the Aarhus Convention.”
    Farrell J. recognised that Article 11 (3) of the EIA Directive allows member states to define “sufficient interest” through national rules, as long as these provide for wide access to justice. However, Farrell J. also stressed in para.93 that raising EU law grounds alone does not satisfy the “sufficient interest” test:
    “It is appropriate to interpret ‘a sufficient interest’ broadly, but EU law does not require it to be interpreted “as broadly as possible” as the Applicant has submitted”
  2. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): The applicant claimed that the Board had failed to properly assess effects on European sites (Malahide Estuary SAC/SPA) under the Appropriate Assessment (AA) obligations in the Directive. Farrell J. accepted that the case raised environmental protection concerns, including issues relating to the Habitats Directive, but ruled that such arguments must be brought by a person with sufficient interest or proximity. Farrell J. observed in para. 103 that the “significance of proximity is linked to potential impact of a proposed development.” There was no evidence that the applicant had any link to or history of engagement with the protected sites, nor any personal connection. He lived 42 kilometres away and had not taken part in the public consultation process.

Key points regarding EU Directives

Farrell J. reiterated that it is Irish law which controls standing, and only where national rules conflict with or fail to meet EU requirements would EU law override them. Farrell J. held that the applicant was not part of the “public concerned” under Article 11 of the EIA Directive because he had not participated in the planning process and had no particular link to the site. Farrell J. rejected the idea that merely invoking EU environmental law grounds, by itself, meets the requirements of “sufficient interest.”

Conclusion

Farrell J. held that the applicant lacked sufficient interest under s. 50A(3)(b)(i) of the Planning and Development Act 2000, citing Grace & Sweetman v. ABP [2017] IESC 10 to emphasise that general concern is insufficient without personal engagement or impact. Leave was refused on the basis that Mr. Murphy did not have standing to bring the claim.

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Coolglas Windfarm Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 1

The applicant sought permission to construct a 13-turbine wind farm in Co. Laois. The application was refused by the respondent because the proposed development was located in an area designated as “not open for consideration” for wind energy in the local County Development Plan, which constituted a material contravention. The respondent, an Bord Pleanála (“the Board”), concluded that this contravention rendered the project contrary to proper planning and sustainable development. The applicant subsequently challenged this refusal in the High Court.

Relevant EU Directives

  1. Renewable Energy Directive (Directive (EU) 2023/2413): The Renewable Energy Directive was not the primary focus but formed a crucial part of the legal context that influenced the Court's overall reasoning. The judgment referenced the Directive in para. 93 as one of the "…three important advances in the legal framework…" that have fundamentally altered the landscape for renewable energy projects, alongside the amended Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 and the ECtHR's decision in KlimaSeniorinnen, no. 53600/20, ECHR 2024.
    The Court noted that the Renewable Energy Directive, together with the Temporary Renewable Energy Regulation (2022/2577), introduces a presumption that renewable energy projects are of overriding public interest. This presumption is important for justifying projects under certain environmental assessments, including Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive. While the applicant's specific ground regarding a breach of the Temporary Regulation's priority rule was not upheld on the facts of this case (as the refusal was based on a development plan contravention, not a habitats assessment, and so the overriding public interest issue in the sense of Art. 3(2) of the Regulation 2022/2577 did not appear to arise), the principles underpinning the Renewable Energy Directive heavily informed the Court's interpretation of national law. Humphreys J. held that the respondent’s failure to exercise its discretion in a way that enabled renewable energy development was inconsistent with the transformative and urgent intent of the EU's updated legal framework. Thus, the Directive's objectives served as a key interpretative tool for construing the respondent’s obligations under s.15 of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015.
  2. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): The applicant argued that the respondent’s decision was invalid because it contravenes Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, claiming that the respondent failed to carry out an appropriate assessment without lacunae, and which failed to contain complete, precise, and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt.
    The Court rejected this argument, finding that the applicants had failed to meet the requisite legal and evidentiary standards. The Court held that the plea was inadequately particularised, amounting to a general assertion rather than a properly pleaded ground that identified precisely how the scientific doubt arose. To substantiate such a claim, an applicant must normally provide expert evidence in the proceedings to demonstrate that the material before the decision-maker created a reasonable scientific doubt that was not dispelled, or that the board's scientific approach was flawed. The applicants provided no such expert affidavit, and the Court found that the inspector's report had in fact engaged with the specific issues raised, such as hydrological connectivity and impacts on bird species, providing reasoned conclusions capable of removing doubt. Consequently, the applicants did not fulfil the burden of proof.

Conclusion

The High Court quashed the respondent's decision to refuse permission.

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100 Meter Tall Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 42

This case concerned the building of a wind turbine out of position from the permitted location (36m from the permitted location). The permission was granted by the respondent, an Bord Pleanála (“the Board”). After a preliminary determination found that the modest positional change did not require Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) screening, the developer obtained retention permission. The applicants challenged this decision, arguing that the very act of conducting a preliminary EIA assessment meant the more onerous ‘substitute consent’ process was required, making the retention permission invalid. The question became whether the respondent had demonstrated any specific illegality which warranted certiorari.

Relevant EU Directives

  1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicants argued that there was an error of law as it was made in breach of Article 4 and/or Annex II, Annex IIA and/or Annex III of the EIA Directive; specifically, that the Clare County Council did not have the jurisdiction to grant the application to retain the unauthorised development because the notice party was required to make an application for substitute consent directly to the respondent with respect to the unauthorised development in accordance with Part XA of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended).
    The Court rejected the applicants' argument that the planning authority lacked jurisdiction. It held that the grant of retention permission was not precluded in this instance because a key condition for the statutory prohibition was not met. The Court reasoned that the respondent had lawfully conducted a preliminary examination of the sub-threshold development, which concluded that there was no real likelihood of significant environmental effects and thus no need for a full EIA screening determination. Since the version of s. 34(12) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 in force at the time only prohibited retention permission if a "screening determination" was required, and the Board validly ruled one out at the preliminary stage, the prohibition was never triggered.
    The Court held that the term "screening determination" in domestic law must be interpreted consistently with the EIA Directive, which itself distinguishes between a “preliminary examination” and a “formal screening determination”. By finding that a valid preliminary examination that excludes the need for further assessment does not equate to a "screening determination," the Court aligned the national procedure with EU principles. 
    The applicants also argued that the proposed development constituted project splitting contrary to Article 4 of the EIA Directive. The Court clarified that the doctrine of project-splitting under Article 4 involves an objective assessment of whether a single project has been artificially fragmented to evade EIA obligations, rather than an inquiry into the developer's subjective intent. The Court held that the remedy for unlawful project-splitting is not the invalidation of the permission but rather an obligation on the decision-maker to assess the application in the context of the overall project and its cumulative and in-combination effects. On the facts, the Court found no project-splitting, as the elements in question were either already permitted or were not part of a single project with the development under review.
    The applicant also argued that the impugned decision was invalid as it breached Article 6(5) of the EIA Directive because the Noise Assessment Reports and Shadow Flicker Reports were not made electronically accessible to the public on the Clare County Council's website. The Court highlighted however that the respondent was not the Clare County Council, hence the argument was not relevant to the current proceedings.  
  2. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC)

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the challenge and upheld the planning permission.

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Concerned Residents of Coolkill v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 265

The applicants sought certiorari quashing planning permission for strategic housing development.

Note: Case details truncated in source document.

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