Planning and Environment Court: EU-relevant case summaries (Draft Title)

Reid v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors [2024] IEHC 27

The applicant, a farmer, challenged planning permission granted to Intel Ireland Ltd by the first respondent, An Bord Pleanála ("the Board"), for modifications to a manufacturing facility in Leixlip, Co. Kildare. The changes involved increased building heights and changes to chemical storage. The applicant's previous challenges in 2017 and 2019 to planning permissions had both failed. Crucially, the applicant argued that the Board broke EU environmental laws by not properly assessing the environmental impact, not following correct planning procedures, and failing to publish its decision online for the public in time. This case focused on whether the 2020 decision complied with obligations under three key EU environmental directives.

Relevant EU Directives

1. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): In line with Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, Humphreys J. noted that a competent authority must provide reasons to show that there is no reasonable scientific doubt as to a project’s effects on a protected site as established in Eco Advocacy (C-721/21) (para. 65). Mr. Reid claimed that the board failed to properly assess ecological risks. Humphreys J. found that the Appropriate Assessment (AA) screening was included in the inspector’s report, which the board lawfully adopted. While clearer documentation was encouraged, Humphreys J. held in para. 71 that “implicit adoption by the board of the inspector’s report on such matters is not in itself a basis to quash a decision.”
2. EIA Directive (Council Directive 2011/92/EU): Mr. Reid alleged that the Intel development should have undergone EIA screening. Humphreys J. rejected this, finding that the Intel development did not fall within Annexes I or II of the Directive. Therefore, no screening or full EIA was legally required. Humphreys J. concluded in para. 86 that it was clear “that this is not an EIA project for the simple reason that it does not come within Annexes I and II of the EIA directive.” 
3. Seveso III Directive (Council Directive 2012/18/EU): Under this directive, industrial sites storing hazardous substances must assess environmental risk. The applicant cited Intel’s storage of silane, and whilst Humphreys J. acknowledged this, he held that the facility was not primarily used for chemical storage and thus, did not qualify under the relevant Annex II categories as the Directive applies only to dedicated chemical storage facilities. Humphreys J. agreed with the Board, stating in para. 79 that: “Put simply, a facility which manufactures circuits and circuit boards is not an industrial estate development project nor is it a facility for the storage of chemicals.”

Key EU Law Points

Regarding remedial obligations, Humphreys J. rejected the applicant’s claim that a fresh AA was required due to earlier alleged defects, noting no prior legal finding of invalidity, no formal request for a remedial AA, and that the EPA had addressed the relevant concerns. Humphreys J. held in para. 62 that “…the applicant hasn’t come anywhere near even attempting [to prove a prior AA breach].” As outlined in para.139, although the substantive planning challenge failed, the Court issued a declaration under the Aarhus Convention, finding that the Board breached its duty by failing to publish its decision online for over 18 months: “This is not a minor or insignificant matter and warrants being marked appropriately by a declaratory order”.

Conclusion

Humphreys J. upheld the planning permission granted to Intel in 2020. However, Humphreys J. issued a declaration against the Board for breaching public access obligations by failing to publish the decision in a timely manner.

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Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558

The applicant challenged a decision by the respondent, An Bord Pleanála (“the Board”), granting planning permission to Pat McDonagh for a Motorway Service Area near Ennis, Co. Clare. The challenge focused on concerns regarding wastewater treatment. The development included an on-site Wastewater Treatment Plant (“WwTP”) that would ultimately discharge into Uisce Éireann’s Clareabbey WwTP. The applicant, a civil engineer and planning consultant, claimed the Clareabbey WwTP lacked hydraulic capacity to accommodate the additional load, and that this could impact protected European sites (Special Area of Conservation, ‘SACs’, and Special Protection Areas, ‘SPAs’) under the Habitats Directive. The Board had relied on submissions from Uisce Éireann - including a “no objection” statement - and on environmental reports, including Annual Environmental Reports (AERs) showing the plant was within capacity. The applicant argued that the Board failed to consider or properly engage with scientific data on capacity and stormwater overflows, breaching obligations under EU environmental law. He also cited past planning refusals and EPA concerns as evidence of insufficient capacity. This case examined two main EU Directives.

Relevant EU Law Directives

1. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): Article 6(3) requires an Appropriate Assessment (“AA”) for any plan or project likely to affect a European site. At para. 37, Holland J. observed the following as to the requirement for scientific evidence and certainty in AA: “Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive requires that AA contain complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt as to the effects of the proposed works on European sites”. Holland J. noted that the Board must do its own AA but may in so doing adopt its inspector’s report as to AA, as established in South West Regional Shopping Centre v An Bord Pleanála [2016] IEHC 84. Holland J. held that the Board could lawfully adopt the inspector’s AA findings and that its conclusion - that there would be no adverse effect on site integrity - was rational and evidence-based. 
2. Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (Council Directive 91/271/EEC) (“the UWWTD”): Mr. Duffy alleged that stormwater overflows (“SWOs”) and WwTP load breaches violated this Directive. Holland J. observed in para. 37 that under this Directive, all urban wastewater must be treated before it is discharged:
   “By Article 4(1) UWWTD, all urban wastewater entering collecting systems must be subject to secondary or equivalent treatment before discharge. The UWWTD recognises a general need for secondary treatment to prevent adverse effect on the environment by urban waste water effluent discharge.”
   Holland J. also discussed, in the same paragraph, the nature of secondary treatment:
   “The UWWTD defines ‘secondary treatment’ as treatment of urban wastewater by a process generally involving biological treatment with a secondary settlement or other process in which the requirements established in Table 1 of Annex I are respected. Table 1 states requirements for discharges from urban waste water treatment plants as to Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD5), Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) and Total Suspended Solids.”
   Holland J. acknowledged the relevance of Commission v. Ireland (Case C-427/17) which emphasised the need for limiting SWOs and ensuring proper treatment. However, Holland J. stated that these points were not properly pleaded. Furthermore, Holland J. accepted that even if SWOs existed, the Board was not required to reject planning permission solely on that basis. Regarding enforcement of WwDL compliance, Holland J. held that this lies primarily with the EPA, not the planning authority.

Key EU Law Points

Holland J. reaffirmed that under the Habitats Directive, AA must be based on complete and precise scientific information and must remove all reasonable scientific doubt. The Board may lawfully adopt its inspector’s AA if fully accepted, and Holland J. found that the Board’s AA was rational and legally sufficient. Under the UWWTD, all wastewater must receive secondary treatment, and uncontrolled stormwater overflows such as SWOs may breach this requirement. Although Holland J. acknowledged relevant CJEU case law on SWOs, ultimately, he declined to rule on those issues as they were not properly pleaded. Holland J. held that enforcement of wastewater treatment compliance lies with the EPA, not the planning authority.

Conclusion

Holland J. dismissed the judicial review, finding that the Board’s AA was lawful and rational. The Board was entitled to rely on Uisce Éireann’s submissions and consistent annual environmental data indicating sufficient WwTP capacity. The applicant failed to properly plead key claims, particularly under the UWWTD, and advanced assertions unsupported by evidence. No breach of EU law or procedural unfairness was established.

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Noel Murphy v. An Bord Pleanála and Fingal County Council [2025] IEHC 117

The applicant sought leave to judicially review the first respondent, An Bord Pleanála’s (“the Board”), decision to grant planning permission for a gas turbine power station in Finglas, Co. Dublin. He challenged the decision on grounds relating to the County Development Plan and alleged failures under the EIA and Habitats Directives. However, he had not participated in any stage of the planning process, despite multiple public consultation opportunities, and admitted he was not personally affected by the development. 

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicant argued that the Board failed to comply with its obligations under the EIA Directive, particularly regarding project splitting and the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process. Farrell J. acknowledged in para. 76 that EU law requires “wide access to justice”, but clarified that this does not mean unlimited access, nor does it require standing for any member of the public raising EU law issues:
   “EU law allows national courts impose their own rules regarding standing, once the rules are compliant with EU Law – the rules must be applied in a manner which satisfies the “wide access to justice” requirement of the Aarhus Convention.”
   Farrell J. recognised that Article 11 (3) of the EIA Directive allows member states to define “sufficient interest” through national rules, as long as these provide for wide access to justice. However, Farrell J. also stressed in para.93 that raising EU law grounds alone does not satisfy the “sufficient interest” test:
   “It is appropriate to interpret ‘a sufficient interest’ broadly, but EU law does not require it to be interpreted “as broadly as possible” as the Applicant has submitted”
2. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): The applicant claimed that the Board had failed to properly assess effects on European sites (Malahide Estuary SAC/SPA) under the Appropriate Assessment (AA) obligations in the Directive. Farrell J. accepted that the case raised environmental protection concerns, including issues relating to the Habitats Directive, but ruled that such arguments must be brought by a person with sufficient interest or proximity. Farrell J. observed in para. 103 that the “significance of proximity is linked to potential impact of a proposed development.” There was no evidence that the applicant had any link to or history of engagement with the protected sites, nor any personal connection. He lived 42 kilometres away and had not taken part in the public consultation process.

Key points regarding EU Directives

Farrell J. reiterated that it is Irish law which controls standing, and only where national rules conflict with or fail to meet EU requirements would EU law override them. Farrell J. held that the applicant was not part of the “public concerned” under Article 11 of the EIA Directive because he had not participated in the planning process and had no particular link to the site. Farrell J. rejected the idea that merely invoking EU environmental law grounds, by itself, meets the requirements of “sufficient interest.”

Conclusion

Farrell J. held that the applicant lacked sufficient interest under s. 50A(3)(b)(i) of the Planning and Development Act 2000, citing Grace & Sweetman v. ABP [2017] IESC 10 to emphasise that general concern is insufficient without personal engagement or impact. Leave was refused on the basis that Mr. Murphy did not have standing to bring the claim.

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Coolglas Windfarm Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 1

The applicant sought permission to construct a 13-turbine wind farm in Co. Laois. The application was refused by the respondent because the proposed development was located in an area designated as “not open for consideration” for wind energy in the local County Development Plan, which constituted a material contravention. The respondent, an Bord Pleanála (“the Board”), concluded that this contravention rendered the project contrary to proper planning and sustainable development. The applicant subsequently challenged this refusal in the High Court.

Relevant EU Directives

1. Renewable Energy Directive (Directive (EU) 2023/2413): The Renewable Energy Directive was not the primary focus but formed a crucial part of the legal context that influenced the Court's overall reasoning. The judgment referenced the Directive in para. 93 as one of the "…three important advances in the legal framework…" that have fundamentally altered the landscape for renewable energy projects, alongside the amended Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 and the ECtHR's decision in KlimaSeniorinnen, no. 53600/20, ECHR 2024.
   The Court noted that the Renewable Energy Directive, together with the Temporary Renewable Energy Regulation (2022/2577), introduces a presumption that renewable energy projects are of overriding public interest. This presumption is important for justifying projects under certain environmental assessments, including Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive. While the applicant's specific ground regarding a breach of the Temporary Regulation's priority rule was not upheld on the facts of this case (as the refusal was based on a development plan contravention, not a habitats assessment, and so the overriding public interest issue in the sense of Art. 3(2) of the Regulation 2022/2577 did not appear to arise), the principles underpinning the Renewable Energy Directive heavily informed the Court's interpretation of national law. Humphreys J. held that the respondent’s failure to exercise its discretion in a way that enabled renewable energy development was inconsistent with the transformative and urgent intent of the EU's updated legal framework. Thus, the Directive's objectives served as a key interpretative tool for construing the respondent’s obligations under s.15 of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015
2. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): The Habitats Directive was not a central contested Directive in the case. The respondent’s refusal to grant planning permission to the applicant was based on the applicant’s material contravention of the relevant County Development Plan, not on adverse impacts on European sites. The Court noted that the respondent, in its decision direction, explicitly stated that it was not pursuing issues relating to archaeology and cultural heritage that had been raised by the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, "…given the substantive reason for refusal…". To the Court, this indicated that the Board saw no need to require further information or make a finding on Habitats Directive compliance because the application was being refused on other, more fundamental grounds related to land-use policy. Therefore, the Court did not need to adjudicate on any alleged failure related to the Habitats Directive, as it was not a live issue in the Board's final decision.

Key Points in EU Law

The Court applied the principle that national law must be interpreted, as far as possible, in light of the wording and purpose of relevant EU law. This is a foundational EU law principle established in Marleasing (C-106/89). The judge did not apply the EU directives directly but used their overarching objectives, specifically, the binding renewable energy and climate targets from the Renewable Energy Directive and the Paris Agreement, to inform a broad, purposive reading of s. 15 of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015.

Conclusion

The High Court quashed the respondent's decision to refuse permission for the wind farm. It found the Board made legal errors by applying the wrong statutory test for material contravention and considering irrelevant factors. Crucially, the Court held that the Board failed in its legal duty under national and EU law to exercise its powers in a way that actively furthers urgent climate goals.

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100 Meter Tall Group and Others v. an Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 42

This case concerned the building of a wind turbine out of position from the permitted location (36m from the permitted location). The permission was granted by the respondent, an Bord Pleanála (“the Board”). After a preliminary determination found that the modest positional change did not require Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) screening, the developer obtained retention permission. The applicants challenged this decision, arguing that the very act of conducting a preliminary EIA assessment meant the more onerous ‘substitute consent’ process was required, making the retention permission invalid. The question became whether the respondent had demonstrated any specific illegality which warranted certiorari.

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicants argued that there was an error of law as it was made in breach of Article 4 and/or Annex II, Annex IIA and/or Annex III of the EIA Directive; specifically, that the Clare County Council did not have the jurisdiction to grant the application to retain the unauthorised development because the notice party was required to make an application for substitute consent directly to the respondent with respect to the unauthorised development in accordance with Part XA of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended).
   
   The Court rejected the applicants' argument that the planning authority lacked jurisdiction. It held that the grant of retention permission was not precluded in this instance because a key condition for the statutory prohibition was not met. The Court reasoned that the respondent had lawfully conducted a preliminary examination of the sub-threshold development, which concluded that there was no real likelihood of significant environmental effects and thus no need for a full EIA screening determination. Since the version of s. 34(12) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 in force at the time only prohibited retention permission if a "screening determination" was required, and the Board validly ruled one out at the preliminary stage, the prohibition was never triggered.
   The Court held that the term "screening determination" in domestic law must be interpreted consistently with the EIA Directive, which itself distinguishes between a “preliminary examination” and a “formal screening determination”. By finding that a valid preliminary examination that excludes the need for further assessment does not equate to a "screening determination," the Court aligned the national procedure with EU principles. 
   
   
   The applicants also argued that the proposed development constituted project splitting contrary to Article 4 of the EIA Directive. The Court clarified that the doctrine of project-splitting under Article 4 involves an objective assessment of whether a single project has been artificially fragmented to evade EIA obligations, rather than an inquiry into the developer's subjective intent. The Court held that the remedy for unlawful project-splitting is not the invalidation of the permission but rather an obligation on the decision-maker to assess the application in the context of the overall project and its cumulative and in-combination effects. On the facts, the Court found no project-splitting, as the elements in question were either already permitted or were not part of a single project with the development under review.
   The applicant also argued that the impugned decision was invalid as it breached Article 6(5) of the EIA Directive because the Noise Assessment Reports and Shadow Flicker Reports were not made electronically accessible to the public on the Clare County Council's website. The Court highlighted however that the respondent was not the Clare County Council, hence the argument was not relevant to the current proceedings.  
2. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): The applicant argued that the respondent’s decision was invalid because it contravenes Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, claiming that the respondent failed to carry out an appropriate assessment without lacunae, and which failed to contain complete, precise, and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt.
   The Court rejected this argument, finding that the applicants had failed to meet the requisite legal and evidentiary standards. The Court held that the plea was inadequately particularised, amounting to a general assertion rather than a properly pleaded ground that identified precisely how the scientific doubt arose. To substantiate such a claim, an applicant must normally provide expert evidence in the proceedings to demonstrate that the material before the decision-maker created a reasonable scientific doubt that was not dispelled, or that the board's scientific approach was flawed. The applicants provided no such expert affidavit, and the Court found that the inspector's report had in fact engaged with the specific issues raised, such as hydrological connectivity and impacts on bird species, providing reasoned conclusions capable of removing doubt. Consequently, the applicants did not fulfil the burden of proof.

Key points in EU Law

The EIA Directive requires environmental assessments to be conducted prior to development consent, and that post-hoc regularisation of unauthorised development is only permissible under exceptional circumstances without circumventing this core obligation as established in Commission v. Ireland (C-50/09). Furthermore, the Habitats Directive was interpreted as requiring that any scientific doubt about a project's impact on European sites must be dispelled before approval, but this obligation does not require the decision-maker to rebut every individual submission; rather, it must provide a reasoned conclusion capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt, with the burden resting on the applicants to prove any failure with evidence.

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the challenge and upheld the planning permission. It concluded that the planning board acted lawfully because a valid preliminary examination ruled out the need for a full environmental impact assessment, meaning the legal prohibition on retention permission did not apply. Furthermore, the Court held that the applicants' various grounds of challenge were either inadequately argued or supported by insufficient evidence to prove any specific illegality in the respondent’s decision.

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100 Meter Tall Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 196

The case concerns the building of a wind turbine out of position from the permitted location (36m from the permitted location). The applicants seized on the consequential modest retention application in order to mount an unsuccessful full-scale challenge to the project. One of the main questions presented to the High Court in this case focused on whether preliminary examination determinations and screening determinations are different concepts within the meaning of Article 4 of the EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EC).

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The Court did not provide a direct, explicit answer to the above proposed question in its analysis for leave to appeal, as it found that the point did not properly arise on the pleadings and was not of public importance. However, it did note in para. 1 that accepting the applicants’ argument would create a "…disconnect between Irish and EU law" and an "absurd" result. It was also noted in para. 27 that:
   1. "there is no public interest in the creation of tension between domestic and European legislation by reference to interpreting common terms in different senses; and
   2. there is no public interest in facilitating unworkable and inconvenient interpretations that defeat the statutory intention that there be a retention.”
2. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): The applicant also argued that Clare County Council did not have jurisdiction because the application to retain authorised development required an appropriate assessment in accordance with Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive and Part XAB of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended) (“the 2000 Act”). However, this argument was not pursued in the applicants’ core ground for appeal. The Court implicitly dismissed its relevance in the leave application by focusing on the lack of a substantiated legal challenge and the fact that the applicants' case had effectively dissolved into a single, technical issue concerning the interpretation of s. 34(12)(b) of the 2000 Act.

Key Points in EU Law

Conclusion

The Court found that the applicants lacked evidence of legal precedent to support their claims of error where this issue was litigated within time or indeed at all. The Court determined that this case is not of public importance nor is it likely to help resolve other cases. The Court held that the applicants failed to present any information that could be considered “crucial” to support their claims. 

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Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála and Others [No. 2] [2025] IEHC 277

The applicant applied to the High Court seeking a certiorari quashing the decision of the first respondent, An Bord Pleanála (“the Board”), to grant planning permission to the notice party for the construction of apartments. The applicant argued that the decision was invalid because the State respondents had failed to properly transpose the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (Directive 2001/42/EC) (“SEA Directive”). The applicant argued that the extension of a Local Area Plan's (LAP) duration without a fresh SEA was a "modification" requiring assessment under the Directive, and that the national legislation permitting such extensions was incompatible with EU law.

Relevant EU Directive

1. SEA Directive (Directive 2001/42/EC): The core dispute was whether a decision to extend the duration of an existing LAP constituted a "modification" under Article 2(a) of the SEA Directive, thereby triggering the assessment requirements of Articles 3(1), (2) and 4.  The applicant argued that the extension was a modification and that s. 19(1)(d) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”), which allows for such extensions, was incompatible with the Directive as it provided no provision for a new Strategic Environmental Assessment. Humphreys J. refused to rule on the issue as the applicant’s case failed on multiple procedural grounds, including that it was an impermissible collateral attack on the decision to extend, which was unchallenged. As the claim failed even on assumptions as to the need for assessment favourable to the applicant, it was held to be unnecessary to decide whether or to what extent a decision to extend an LAP requires SEA.

Key Points of EU Law

Humphreys J. noted at para. 80 that the applicant’s challenge was “manifestly a collateral attack on the validity of decision of the council to extend the plan, brought outside the time-limit and without an application to extend time.” The applicant had failed to challenge the exercise of power within the deadline established in s.50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000.

The Court also distinguished between the validity of the of an unchallenged decision and any ongoing remedial obligation for a past breach. Humphreys J. clarified that even if an SEA was required for the extension but not carried out, this would not automatically invalidate the decision. In para.91, the Court stated that it would give rise to a separate:

 "…obligation to rectify effects, if any, of a breach of EU law assessment requirements".

This obligation is not automatic; an applicant must: Plead the existence of such effects; call upon the relevant authority to carry out the remedial obligation; and discharge the burden of proof to show that there are actual effects that need to be addressed. 

Conclusion

The Court dismissed the proceedings. The applicant failed to launch proceedings within the statutory deadline established in s.50 of the 2000 Act. The Court also found that the applicant relied on EIA case law by analogy to support their argument, which the Court found to be “misplaced” (at paras. 58-59).  The substantive SEA claim was not decided: “As the claim fails even on assumptions as to the need for assessment favourable to the applicant, it is unnecessary to decide whether or to what extent a decision to extend an LAP requires SEA.” (at para. 94(ix)) 

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Byrne v. Fingal County Council and Others [2025] IEHC 204

The applicant challenged the exercise of powers by the first respondent pursuant to  s. 38 of the Road Traffic Act 1994 (“1994 Act”) and s. 95 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (“1961 Act”) to make alterations to the traffic management arrangements on a street in Malahide. The applicant sought interlocutory relief in respect of the pedestrianisation of the street. 

Relevant EU Directive

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicant sought a declaration that Regulation 120 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, as amended, infringed Articles 2(1) and 4(3) of the EIA Directive, and should be set aside or declared invalid. The applicant argued that the respondent's development plan failed to meet the required standard of care, as evidenced by its failure to properly assess the environmental consequences of traffic diversion onto surrounding streets.
   Article 2 of the EIA Directive establishes the fundamental rule that an EIA is mandatory for any project likely to have significant environmental effects due to its nature, size, or location. To implement this, Article 4(3) allows member states to create specific definitions for such projects, which Ireland did by establishing a size-based threshold, the 'area involved', for urban development projects in its regulations. In domestic legislation, this ‘area involved’ for urban development is 2 hectares before an EIA is required. The Court rejected the applicant’s argument due to the physical works being restricted to 0.22 hectares and thus considered a “sub-threshold”. Therefore, a mandatory EIA was not required.
   The applicant also argued, on the basis of Article 2(1) of the EIA Directive, which states that the Directive's purpose cannot be circumvented by splitting a project the project in question should be considered part of a larger, supra-threshold project. Following CJEU jurisprudence and statements from the Board Inspector’s assessment that the New Street project was "functionally independent" and "not integral" to the other projects. The Court held that it was legitimate for a local authority to advance distinct parts of a wider strategy individually and that no project splitting had occurred on the facts of this case.

Key Points in EU Law

Article 2(1) of the EIA Directive establishes a two-stage test: (i) the "project as a whole" must be identified for assessment, which can extend beyond the specific application for consent; (ii) if a sub-threshold project is part of a larger, supra-threshold project, it may itself require an EIA. Second, the definition of this "whole" is based on factors like geographical proximity, similarity, and functional interdependence. Furthermore, the obligation to consider cumulative effects is not restricted to projects of the same kind.
To determine the "area involved" under Article 4(3) of the EIA Directive, the Court applied the fundamental principle from Kraaijeveld (C-72/95): while member states have discretion to set thresholds, this discretion is limited by the overriding obligation in Article 2(1) to ensure all projects likely to have significant environmental effects are subject to an assessment. It held that the concept of the "area involved" in a project for threshold purposes refers to the physical footprint of the works, not the wider, indirect zone of influence. While an EIA was not warranted, a project that is sub-threshold based on this interpretation must still undergo a screening process to determine if it is likely to have significant environmental effects, ensuring the objective of Article 2(1) is not circumvented.

Conclusion

The High Court largely dismissed the applicant's challenge. While it granted a declaration that Fingal County Council was in breach of its statutory duty for failing to adopt a Local Area Plan for Malahide, it refused the primary relief of certiorari. The regulations were found to not be invalid as they could be read harmoniously with EU law on standard C-106/89 Marleasing principles.

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Concerned Residents of Coolkill Sandyford Downs and Lamb's Brook and Another v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 265

The applicants sought certiorari quashing the order of the respondent, an Bord Pleanála (“the Board”), which granted planning permission to the notice party for a strategic housing development. They argued the decision was invalid because it violated the density rules in the County Development Plan 2022-2028 (“CDP”) and misapplied the Sustainable Urban Housing Guidelines. The applicants alleged non-compliance with other CDP standards. Secondly, the applicant believed that the Board breached multiple EIA provisions under the 2001 Regulations and the EIA Directive, and the EIA Screening Report was non-compliant with Schedule 7A of the Regulations and Annex III of the Directive.

Relevant EU Law

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The case centred on the legal test for screening under Article 4(2) to (6) of the EIA Directive. The Court analysed the core obligation in Article 2(1), which requires an EIA for projects likely to have significant effects on the environment, in light of recent CJEU jurisprudence. The applicant argued that the Board had failed this standard by screening out EIA without adequate site-specific geological information, despite the potential for significant effects from excavation. The Court dismissed this challenge. It found that while the absence of certain site investigation data was regrettable, the Board had acted with sufficient information. The Board was able to reach a reasonable screening judgement as it possessed additional pertinent data, such as geological mapping and party submissions. The Court emphasised that an EIA screening is intended to identify the relatively small number of projects requiring a full EIA and that a decision can be made on sufficient information even if certain details remain unknown. 

Key points in EU Law

The High Court looked to the Waltham Abbey (Case C-41/24) which details the high legal threshold for deciding that an EIA is not required for a project: an EIA is mandatory whenever a project carries a risk of significant environmental effects. This requirement is interpreted through the lens of the precautionary principle, meaning a risk is deemed to exist if objective evidence cannot exclude the likelihood of significant harm. Consequently, to lawfully screen out an EIA, the competent authority must be able to conclude with certainty that all reasonable scientific doubt has been ruled out. This requirement, to base the decision on the “…most comprehensive information possible”, must be applied in a functional and proportionate manner. This standard does not demand an absolute or exhaustive level of information, but rather information that is objectively sufficient for the screening task at hand, considering what may reasonably be required of a developer. 

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the challenge to the EIA screening. Holland J. determined that the respondent had had a sufficient, rational basis for its decision that the project was not likely to have significant environmental effects, despite the absence of certain site-specific data. The ruling thereby affirms that the EIA screening process under the EIA Directive serves to avoid unnecessary full assessments where adequate information exists to lawfully exclude significant effects.

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Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 15

The applicant applied to the High Court seeking an order of certiorari by way of application for judicial review quashing a decision made by the respondent, an Bord Pleanála, to grant planning permission to the notice party, Statkraft Ireland Ltd on appeal for a wind farm development. The applicant also sought a declaration that the decision contravened the public participation requirements of EU law, because it claimed that the Board failed the make the amended Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) available on its website; an order providing for the costs of the application; and a stay on the decision's operation pending the Court's ruling.

Relevant EU Directives

1. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): The applicant argues that the respondent failed to comply with Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive by unlawfully screening out the hen harrier from an AA. The core of this contention is that the Board’s decision was not based on the best scientific knowledge, as it failed to properly engage with and dispel the reasonable scientific doubts raised by the National Parks & Wildlife Service regarding inadequate bird surveys and the risk posed by turbine blades to the birds' flight paths. The legal standard, as emphasised by the applicant with reference to CJEU jurisprudence such as Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment (C-293/17) and Sweetman (C-258/11), is that an Appropriate Assessment (“AA”) must contain complete and definitive findings capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt.  
2. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicant contends that the respondent breached its obligations under the EIA Directive, specifically Articles 6(3)(b) and 9(1), by failing to make a complete and accessible EIAR available to the public. The argument distinguishes between two temporal obligations: the duty under Article 6(3)(b) to make the EIAR available during the appeal process, and the duty under Article 9(1) to publish the decision and relevant documents after the decision has been made. As an environmental NGO, the applicant was held by the High Court to be indirectly prejudiced because the absence of a complete and intelligible EIAR on the Board’s website hindered its ability to enforce the implementation of mitigation measures. The Board’s website did not serve its required function under EIA Directive to make environmental information electronically accessible through a centralised and easy to access portal, thereby undermining the public’s right to participate in environmental decision-making as guaranteed by the Directive.

Key EU Law Points

Conclusion

The High Court concluded that the application for judicial review was largely unsuccessful. While it granted a declaration the respondent had breached its publication duties under the Planning and Development Act 2000 by using incomprehensible file names on its website, it refused the primary order of certiorari to quash the planning permission. The Court held that this publication failure, occurring after the decision was made, did not invalidate the permission, especially as the applicant suffered no specific prejudice. Furthermore, the Court found no infirmity in the AA screening, ruling that the respondent was not obliged to provide a point-by-point rebuttal to submissions and had sufficiently reasoned its decision to screen out the hen harrier, with costs awarded to the applicant only for the issue on which it succeeded.

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Eco Advocacy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 195

Despite receiving declaratory relief and costs, the applicant did not obtain certiorari on a wind farm in a prior version of the case (Eco Advocacy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 15) because it did not provide evidence sufficient to show that the respondent’s reasons for its assessments were defective. In response, the applicant launched thirteen points or sub-points of alleged exceptional public importance (under eight broad headings). These included the questions: whether the respondent had taken account of a submission by the Minister advising the planning authority that the developer’s screening for an Appropriate Assessment (“AA”) was not supported by scientific advice; was it necessary for the respondent to address in its reasons for screening out a development for AA, the opinions to the contrary and/or any reasonable doubts expressed in an expert scientific opinion if it has decided to grant permission and; in the context of the case is it in accordance with the EIA Directive to impose a 105 minute limit to the applicant’s oral submissions. ¹

Relevant EU Directives

1. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC) : The Court held that the requirements of the Habitats Directive regarding the extent of reasons needed for an AA screening have been definitively clarified by the CJEU in a prior case involving the same applicant, Eco Advocacy (C-721/21). The Court held that while a competent authority must provide reasons sufficient to demonstrate that a project will not adversely affect the integrity of a European site, there is no obligation to rebut every contrary scientific submission.

Key EU Law Points

The judgment reiterates that the burden of proof was on the applicant to prove that the decision was flawed. The Court also determined that with regards to the 105-minute time limit, that member states have procedural autonomy, provided that such rules do not render the rights granted under the relevant EU directives as impossible to exercise.

Conclusion

The Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety. It was also held that none of the thirteen points were issues of law but of applicability. None of the points were of public importance and they failed to meet the standards of the public interest test.  

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Friends of Ardee Bog v. an Bord Pleanála and Others [2025] IESC 13

The applicants filed a judicial review to challenge certain decisions of the first respondent (an Bord Pleanála) in respect of the construction of a 4.5 kilometre road and two bridges at Ardee, Co. Louth. This judgment concerns the single question as to whether the Supreme Court should grant the applicant leave to appeal from a decision of the High Court pursuant to Article 34.5.4° of the Constitution.

Relevant EU Directives

1. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): While the inspector determined that the project not likely to be any direct or indirect effects on any Special Protection Area (“SPA”) environment, an Appropriate Assessment (“AA”) was conducted for the purposes of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive. However, there was no site-specific conservation objectives in place for one of the potentially impacted SPAs and the applicant maintains, inter alia, that this omission was fatal to the validity of the Board's decision and that there was no proper AA screening as required by Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive.

Key Points of EU Law

The judgment emphasises that the existence of valid, site-specific conservation objectives for a European site may be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for a competent authority to conduct a valid Appropriate Assessment screening under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. This issue was deemed to be one of general public importance, given its potential to affect a large number of development projects.

Conclusion

The Court granted the applicant leave to appeal to on the specific issue of the validity of An Bord Pleanála's decision given the absence of site-specific conservation objectives for the Special Protection Area. Leave to appeal was refused on all other grounds, which the Court found had either been abandoned in the High Court or were not properly pursued.

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Malone and Another v. Laois County Council and Others [2025] IEHC 345

The applicants sought declaratory reliefs for various breaches of EU law by the first and second respondents (“Laois CC” and “the Board”) in unlawfully granting various planning permissions for a quarrying site. In particular, the applicants sought injunctions and declarations under s.160 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, arguing that the quarry site was operating through a history of planning permissions that were invalid due to systemic breaches of the EIA Directive.

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicant argued that the that the planning permissions were invalid due to breaches of the EIA Directive. However, the applicant had failed to state which exact Articles of the Directive were violated.
   
   In addition, it was noted that a domestic procedural rule must not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficulty to exercise EU law rights conferred by the EIA Directive. It was determined that the 8-week time limit to file judicial review as established by s. 50 Planning Development Act 2000 did not reach this threshold. Since the applicants had never sought judicial review within the strict statutory time limits, the permissions were long since immune from direct or collateral challenge.
   
   The High Court clarified that the obligation to provide an effective remedy under EU law is fulfilled by making a single, sufficient procedure available. The existence of judicial review as a means to challenge planning permissions satisfies this requirement; there is no duty to provide additional or alternative legal avenues, nor to ensure that every conceivable remedy is effective for vindicating an EU law right.

Key Points in EU Law

The CJEU has consistently held, in cases such as Stadt Wiener Neustadt (Case C 348/15), that reasonable national time limits for challenging administrative decisions are fully compatible with EU law. These limits are fundamentally justified by the overriding need for legal certainty, which protects both individuals and public authorities by allowing them to rely on the stability of decisions after a defined period. The High Court found that such rules, provided they are not excessively short or applied rigidly without the possibility of extension, do not violate the core EU law principles of effectiveness (by making it impossibly difficult to exercise EU rights) or equivalence (by being less favourable than rules for similar domestic claims). Consequently, the Irish eight-week judicial review period for planning decisions was deemed a legitimate expression of national procedural autonomy, and the applicants’ failure to utilise this primary remedy within the statutory timeframe could not be circumvented through a collateral challenge in separate enforcement proceedings.

Conclusion

The Court held that the exclusive route to question the validity of such permissions was through timely judicial review, a procedure the Applicants failed to utilise. The case was permitted to proceed only on the narrow, discrete issues of whether the original quarrying permission had expired and if unauthorised waste activities were occurring on the site. All other claims, including those premised on alleged breaches of EU environmental directives, were dismissed as bound to fail.

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Massey v. an Bord Pleanála [No. 4] [2025] IEHC 309

A developer, Curns Energy Limited, sought planning permission for a renewable energy project, which the respondent classified as Strategic Infrastructure Development (SID). The applicant challenged this decision, arguing primarily that the respondent carried out an Appropriate Assessment (“AA”) screening for the project under the Habitats Directive in the absence of legally valid conservation objectives for the relevant European sites. He also raised a technical point concerning the corporate identity of the applicant for permission.

Relevant EU Directives

1. Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC): The applicants questioned what criteria a court can withhold certiorari where AA screening was carried out in the absence of valid conservation objectives, and if those criteria were applied correctly in the present case.
   
   The Court acknowledged that the absence of site-specific conservation objectives was a procedural shortcoming, for which it granted declaratory relief. However, it refused to quash the planning permission based on the fundamental purpose of the Habitats Directive's AA under Article 6(3) which is to prevent adverse effects on European sites. Based on the specific evidence, the High Court found that the development could not have had any effect on these protected sites. Therefore, even assuming a breach occurred, the Court applied the principle of "harmless error", holding that the violation did not affect the outcome. The Court justified this by aligning with the CJEU's ruling in Gemeinde Altrip (C-72/12), which permits withholding annulment for defective assessments where the error is proven to be inconsequential.
2. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): To address the issue regarding the AA, the Court looked to the EIA Directive and CJEU jurisprudence to determine the limits of the “harmless error” doctrine. In Gemeinde Altrip, a “harmless error” for a defective assessment does not require annulment if evidence shows no impact on protected sites. By aligning the case with Altrip, the Court found the alleged defect was procedural and, on the uncontroverted evidence, harmless, thus quashing the permission was unnecessary.

Key Points of EU Law

The examination of both directives was performed in the context of the “harmless error” principle as established in Gemeinde Altrip and affirmed in Irish law by Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 9. It ruled that a procedural breach of the Habitats Directive, such as conducting an AA without valid conservation objectives, does not automatically invalidate a planning permission if uncontroverted evidence proves the error had no actual effect on protected European sites. The High Court prioritised the substantive protective goals of the directives instead of adhering to a rigid procedural application when no harm had been committed. The Court further stressed that harmless error applies only to procedural irregularities, not substantive irregularities such as the complete lack of an EIA.

Conclusion

The High Court refused leave to appeal the matter to the Supreme Court and upheld the planning permission. As the procedural breach was shown to pose no effect on protected European sites, the certiorari was not warranted.

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McGowan v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 405

The applicants sought a certiorari quashing the decision of the respondent, to grant planning permission for a proposed windfarm development including 13 wind turbines in Bunnyconnellan, Co. Mayo and a hydrogen plant in Castleconnor, Co. Sligo. The applicant argued that the impugned decision of the respondent was invalid as it violated Articles 2, 3, 5, 8, 8a and Annex IV of the EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU) as the respondent failed to carry out a lawful EIA to adequately assess the environmental effects of the continuation of domestic turf cutting at the site for the duration of the initial permission, and that the respondent failed to assess the baseline.

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The Court engaged significantly with the Directive's provisions, particularly its definition of “development consent” as utilised in Article 2(1) of the EIA Directive. ‘Development consent’ as defined in Article 1(2)(c) of the Directive recognises that authorisation for a project may involve 'the decision of the competent authority or authorities'. This wording was used in rejecting the applicants' argument for a mandatory joint assessment procedure, confirming that the EU legal framework does not require the centralisation of EIA functions within a single body.
   
   Furthermore, the Court's analysis affirmed that the Directive’s requirements are to be interpreted in a practical manner, focusing on whether the assessment, as a whole, adequately identified, described, and assessed the project's likely significant effects on the environment, including in-combination effects with other projects, without imposing obligations that extend to activities beyond the developer's control.

Key Points in EU Law

The High Court rejected the argument that the EIA requires a single, joint assessment to be conducted by multiple consenting authorities. As defined by Article 1(2)(c) of the Directive expressly states that multiple authorities may be involved, and there is no EU law obligation to centralise all EIA functions in one decision-maker.

The Court endorsed a substantive rather than a formalistic approach to reviewing the EIA. It reiterated that a challenge to the adequacy of an EIA must be supported by evidence, typically expert evidence, to demonstrate a legal flaw. Mere assertion or a merits-based disagreement dressed in legal language is insufficient to vitiate a decision.

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the proceedings. It found that the applicants had failed to plead their case with sufficient particularity, provide evidence to discharge the burden of proof, and establish that the respondent's decision was made in breach of the EIA Directive. The Court upheld the planning permission, confirming that the EIA carried out was lawful under EU law.

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Nagle View Turbine Aware [No. 2] v. an Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 3

This case is an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeal, following a dismissal of a judicial review from the High Court. The applicant had challenged a wind farm development approved by the respondent. The applicant challenged whether the respondent had conducted a thorough assessment of the noise impacts of the proposed development in circumstances.

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicant questioned whether the respondent’s assessment was as “complete as possible” according to the EIA Directive. The applicant’s frame of reference for the Directive was from Solvay v. Région Wallonne (Case C 50-09). The High Court determined that the applicant had not established any unreasonableness in carrying out the EIA. The applicant in judicial review proceedings bears the overall onus of proof.

Key EU Law points

Humphreys J. reiterated that the burden of proof in judicial review proceedings rests on the applicant, who must not merely assert but must evidentially prove any alleged failure in the assessment process. The proposed points of law were found to be based on non-factual premises, incorrectly characterised the judgment, and included unasserted points.

Conclusion

Humphreys J. refused the application for leave to appeal. The High Court found that the applicant’s points of law were not of exceptional public importance, were fact-specific, and did not transcend the circumstances of the case.

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Ryan v. an Bord Pleanála and Others [2025] IEHC 111

This case concerned a judicial review challenge brought by the applicant, against a decision by the first respondent, an Bord Pleanála (“the Board”), to grant planning permission to Analog Devices for the expansion of its industrial campus. The applicant contested the permission on several grounds, primarily arguing that the Board had erred in law by failing to require a full EIA for the project and by not conducting a proper Appropriate Assessment (“AA”) with subsidiary claims related to potential water pollution and a failure to assess cumulative impacts on the environment.

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The High Court had to determine whether the proposed developments fell within any project classes listed in Annex I or II of the EIA Directive. The Court reiterated that the obligation to conduct an EIA arises only if a project, by its form, nature, or type, is classified under one of the Directive's specified categories. It rejected a broad, purposive interpretation that would bring industrial projects like the Analog Campus under the category of "urban development" as described by Annex II, emphasising that such classifications must be based on the project's inherent characteristics and not merely its location. The Court also clarified that the concept of a "mandatory EIA" in para.160 is better understood as "automatic EIA" for projects exceeding set thresholds, while in para.158-159 "sub-threshold EIA[s]" apply to projects likely to have significant environmental effects, both being mandatory when their respective legal conditions are met.
2. The Water Frameworks Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC): While the applicant did not make a specific challenge alleging a breach to the Water Frameworks Directive. Instead, water quality issues were framed within the context of the EIA and AA assessments. The High Court found that the alleged pollution, primarily concerning misconnections to the stormwater system, was not substantiated by evidence linking it to the proposed developments. Consequently, the Board was entitled to rely on the second respondent’s expert evidence and the imposition of a specific planning condition to manage any residual risk of effluent misconnection. The Court emphasised that the primary responsibility for enforcing water quality standards, including those under the WFD, lies with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other specialised regulatory bodies, not the planning authority within the context of a development consent decision.

Key EU Law Points

The EIA Directive applies only to projects falling within the classes specified in Annex I or II. The High Court examined the principle from the CJEU case Kraaijeveld (C-72/95) which, in para. 31, established that the EIA Directive has a "…wide scope and a broad purpose" to ensure that projects likely to have significant environmental effects are properly assessed. Therefore, the Courts should interpret the categories in Annex II broadly and purposively to ensure the Directive's environmental objectives are not undermined by legal technicalities. National courts may exercise discretion to refuse relief if quashing a decision would serve no substantive environmental purpose, particularly where EIA obligations were not engaged.

The enforcement of Water Framework Directive objectives falls primarily to specialised environmental regulators, not the planning process. A planning permission cannot be invalidated by general accusations of water pollution; any alleged breach of the WFD must be specifically pleaded and supported by evidence demonstrating a causal link to the project. The High Court affirmed the distinct roles of planning and environmental authorities, noting that the EPA holds the statutory duty for monitoring and enforcing discharge compliance.

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the judicial review. It held that the proposed developments did not fall within any project class under the EIA Directive. Furthermore, the Court found that the AA conducted was lawful and rational, and that the planning authority had adequately addressed all environmental concerns, including those related to water quality, through evidence-based analysis and the imposition of specific planning conditions.

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Ryanair v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 194

The applicant sought to appeal the High Court’s dismissal of its judicial review, which had challenged a planning permission for a tunnel at Dublin Airport. The applicant's appeal was based solely on a narrow point regarding the inspector's wording on a Local Area Plan contravention. This application concerned whether this specific, technical issue was suitable for a further appeal.

Relevant EU Directive

1. The Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC): The High Court acknowledged that this formed a significant part of the applicant’s original argument but was expressly abandoned for the purposes of the leave to appeal application. Consequently, no substantive analysis of its provisions was undertaken in this judgment.

Key Points in EU Law

The Court did not engage in substantive EU law as the applicant’s remaining legal point concerned the interpretation of the Local Area Plan under domestic planning law.

Conclusion

The High Court refused the application for leave to appeal. It found that the proposed question did not arise from the pleadings or the substance of the judgment, did not constitute a pure point of law of exceptional public importance, and that a further appeal would not be in the public interest, due to the project’s safety rationale.

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Sweetman v. Environmental Protection Agency and Others [2025] IEHC 144

The applicant sought certiorari quashing the decision of the first respondent to grant an Industrial Emissions License to the notice party for the disposal of animal carcasses and waste. The applicant also sought a declaration that the State had failed to properly transpose Articles 1 to 6 of the EIA Directive into national law regarding the granting of development consent for projects that require such licences.

Relevant EU Directive

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The Court, however, did not determine the substantive issue regarding the EIA Directive. Holland J. concluded that the applicant lacked the necessary standing to prosecute the proceedings. It was held that the applicant was pursuing an actio popularis, as he professed no personal interest in the environmental effects of the project, lacked proximity to the site, and had not participated in the licence review process. The judgment reaffirmed that while EU law and the Aarhus Convention require “wide access to justice”, they do not mandate that national courts grant standing to any individual to litigate a generalised complaint about the legality of a licensing regime. Consequently, the proceedings were dismissed on this preliminary issue, leaving the core question of the EIA Directive's correct application in this context undecided.

Key Points in EU Law

Holland J. reaffirmed that the "wide access to justice" required by the Aarhus Convention and Article 11 of the EIA Directive does not equate to an actio popularis for any individual. By examining prior national jurisprudence, the Court highlighted the significance of the term “sufficient interest”. The judgment clarifies that while EU environmental law aims for broad access, member states retain the discretion to define "sufficient interest" through national rules, and such rules can permissibly consider factors like a claimant's proximity to a project and their participation in the prior administrative process.

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the case as the applicant lacked the sufficient legal standing to justify the objection. The issue of whether the Environmental Protection Agency should have conducted an EIA was therefore never decided.

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Ventaway Ltd v. an Comisiúin Pleanála [2025] IEHC 406

The applicant sought judicial review after the respondent refused planning permission for a 24-storey mixed-use building in Dublin. One of the key grounds for challenge was that the respondent failed to carry out its own EIA. The applicant argued this was a breach of national law and Articles 3-9 of the EIA Directive, which outline the core procedures for an EIA. The Court noted that the respondent’s decision contained no record of such an assessment, despite the project being accompanied by an Environmental Impact Assessment Report.

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): Humphreys J. explicitly declined to make a definitive ruling on whether the EIA Directive itself mandates an assessment prior to a refusal of permission, because the High Court had determined that the issue focused on the unambiguous requirements of the Planning and Development Act 2000. This was despite the respondent's argument that the Directive's obligation under Article 2(1) to carry out an EIA “…before development consent is given” did not arise upon a refusal for "non-EIA reasons," a requirement it deemed unjustifiable and burdensome. Since the case could be, and was, resolved on this straightforward reading of national law, which the Court found to be clear and mandatory, there was no legal necessity to interpret the underlying EU Directive, rendering the complex EU law point moot.

Key Points in EU Law

The Court noted that the analysis of the EIA Directive was obiter, stating that only if the national law were ambiguous would a question for a preliminary reference to the CJEU arise.

Conclusion

The High Court granted the applicant's request for an order of certiorari, quashing the respondent's decision to refuse permission. The Court found the decision invalid

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Friends of Killymooney Lough v. an Coimisiún Pleanála and Others [2025] IEHC 407

The applicants sought a certiorari quashing the order of the first respondent, an Bord Pleanála (“the Board”), for the construction of a single storey retail unit, 297 car parking spaces, a drive through ‘café’, a petrol filling station and associated development at Cock Hill, Cavan Town, Co.Cavan. The applicant also sought an additional certiorari quashing the decision by the Minister for the Environment, Climate and Communications because he made a legal error by failing to conduct a mandatory environmental assessment at the correct time as required by the Climate Action Plan, thus making the entire decision invalid.

Relevant EU Directives

1. EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU): The applicant argued that the Board failed to identify the effect of the traffic increase that the Developer EIA acknowledged the Proposed Development would cause, which could potentially increase emissions, thereby failing to adhere to legal obligations to reduce emissions.
   
   The Court rejected this argument. It found that, contrary to the applicant's claim, the Board did have regard to climate goals. This was demonstrated through the Inspector's report, which engaged with both local and national climate policy, and by affidavit evidence from a Board member confirming awareness of the relevant Climate Action Plan. The Court held that the Inspector's conclusion, that the quantified increase in emissions was minimal and thus not a "significant effect", was an evaluative judgement the Board was entitled to make on the evidence before it. The applicant failed to demonstrate that this judgement was incorrect.

Key Points of EU Law

The Court emphasised that the concept of a “significant effect” under the EIA Directive does not establish a precise legal test. Whether a project is likely to have a significant effect is a question of degree that calls for the exercise of judgement by the expert planning authority. This evaluative judgement is reviewable by the courts only on the grounds of irrationality or unreasonableness, not on the merits.

The High Court firmly rejected the applicant's argument that the EIA was defective for failing to assess the cumulative impacts of all vehicle emissions from all projects nationally. It held in para. 197 that such an interpretation would impose an "impossibly onerous and unworkable obligation" on developers and authorities, which is not required by the text, context, or purpose of the EIA Directive.

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review challenge in its entirety. The Court found no legal basis to quash the planning permission for the retail development, holding that the planning authority had properly considered climate policies and carried out a valid environmental impact assessment. It also rejected the separate challenge to the national 2024 Climate Action Plan, deeming it an impermissibly abstract and academic challenge.

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